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A main component of customs unions is a common trade policy on imports from non-member 
countries. Trade policy covers both tariff and non-tariff barriers like trade procedures. We argue 
that since trade procedures vary markedly across EU countries, the EU is not, strictly speaking, a 
customs union. To illustrate this, we estimate the impact of trade procedures on exports from non-
EU countries and find a highly statistically significant and negative effect. Simulating what the 
effects would be of harmonizing trade procedures, i.e. to actually complete the EU customs 
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1  Introduction 
The successive rounds of multilateral trade negotiations have contributed to lowering the 
levels of the European Union’s customs duties to historically low levels. In addition, most 
quantitative trade restrictions, like import quotas or voluntary export restraints, have been 
removed in sectors like textiles and clothing, and passenger cars, during the past two 
decades. The trade impeding effect of other non-tariff barriers, like technical standards, 
has also been reduced, partly as a result of the completion of the European single market. 
There remain, however, trade obstacles of a  more administrative  nature, commonly 
named trade procedures, that are under the responsibility of national authorities. The 
dismantlement or reduction of traditional trade barriers has given these trade procedures a 
prominent role in the current Doha Round negotiations.  
The objective of this paper is threefold. First, we argue that since trade procedures 
vary markedly across EU countries, the EU is not, strictly speaking, a customs union. 
Second, we investigate whether these differences in trade procedures matter in practice. 
We estimate the quantitative effects of inefficient trade procedures on trade volumes, and 
use these figures to illustrate how much trade volumes would grow if the EU customs 
union was completed through trade procedure harmonization. Third, we  discuss the 
policy implications of our results for  the distribution of the responsibility for trade 
procedures between the national and community levels. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. The next section illustrates the wide 
disparities in trade procedures among EU countries. It  also  discusses how these 
differences affect the form of regional integration and can contribute to trade deflection 
and  the emergence of price disparities across member countries. The third section 
estimates the impact of trade procedures on the exports of non-member countries. Using 
this estimate, the fourth section simulates the gains in the form of increased exports for 
third countries of a harmonization of trade procedures. In a final section, the main results 
are summarized and some policy conclusions are drawn on how to complete the EU 
customs union.   3 
2  Trade Procedures and Forms of Economic Integration 
2.1  Trade Procedures in the EU 
The term trade procedures refers to customs practices and documentary requirements that 
are imposed on goods and services crossing national borders. Customs practices cover 
routines like the use of information technology, use of computerized container scanning, 
risk management techniques, degree of reliance on importing and exporting firms, skill 
level among staff, bureaucratic structures and extent of corruption. Documentary 
requirements consist, for example, of certificate of origin, insurance certificate, certificate 
of conformity with product standards and carrier declaration. 
More or less burdensome trade procedures result in more or less lengthy delays 
that impose varying costs on import and export activities. These costs may arise in 
several ways. The most straightforward reason is that, depending on the type of good, 
there may be depreciation costs – either in terms of physical depreciation or because 
products quickly lose their market value. In addition to depreciation costs, delays could 
cause costs for traders because companies have to keep goods in store instead of just 
being able to quickly ship the goods. For agricultural goods, such storage costs may not 
just be a matter of misallocated resources, but could lead to even higher costs for 
refrigeration etc. Long delays are also  associated with increased uncertainty  about 
delivery times, which means that companies will have to waste resources on having wider 
safety margins, and may be unable to take advantage of business opportunities.  
The more complex the procedures, the longer the associated delays, and the 
higher  the costs for traders. Significant welfare gains are therefore  expected from 
improvements in trade procedures that reduce the time delays occurring when crossing 
national borders. In fact, the net gain for society of a reduction in trade costs following a 
simplification and streamlining of trade procedures is actually larger than what arises if a 
price-equivalent tariff or import quotas is removed, because there is no tariff or import 
rent to be lost. 
To measure empirically the trade barriers caused by trade procedures, we use the 
number of days it takes to comply with all necessary procedures at the border when 
importing to the various EU27 countries. The data comes from the World Bank’s (2010a) 
Doing Business Database. In the Trading Across Borders section of this large survey,   4 
local freight forwarders, shipping lines, customs brokers, port officials and banks are 
asked about how much time it would take for a hypothetical trading firm to comply with 
all the necessary procedures to import a well-defined, standardized good. All procedures 
from the good’s  arrival at the port of entry until the delivery at the warehouse are 
included, and if the procedures can be completed in parallel, they are assumed to have 
taken place simultaneously.
4 The same measure has been used by, for instance, Djankov 
et al (2010), Martínez-Zarzoso and Márquez-Ramos (2008) and Persson (2008).
5
According to the Doing Business Database, the number of days needed to comply 
with all necessary procedures to import the same good into the countries of the European 
Union varies considerably. As presented in Table 1, it goes from 5 days for Cyprus, 
Denmark and Estonia to no less than 25 days for Greece, Poland and the Slovak 
Republic. The times required for the same good to cross the national border is thus five 
times longer in the poorest performing countries than in the best performing ones. 
Interestingly, there seems to be a rather clear geographical pattern with most countries 
that entered the EU in 2004 among the least efficient performers and older members, 
particularly the small Northern European countries, among the best performers. Notable 
exceptions to this pattern are Estonia, Greece, Portugal and Italy.  
 
To offer an intuitive understanding of the magnitude of trade procedures as a 
barrier to trade, Table 1 also gives estimates of the tariff equivalents of the time to import 
across borders and, for comparison,  the average (weighted) import tariffs for the 
countries of the European Union.
6
                                                 
4 The hypothetical trading firm, that is a private limited liability company, fully domestically owned with a 
minimum of 60 employees, is located in the country’s most populous city but does not operate within an 
export processing zone (EPZ) or an industrial estate with special export or import privileges. The good is 
assumed to be non-hazardous, not to include any military arms or equipment, not to require refrigeration or 
any special environment, nor any special phytosanitary or environmental safety standards, and to be 
shipped in a dry-cargo, 20-foot, full container load. Trade is assumed to take place by ocean transportation. 
For more specifics, see World Bank (2010a), or Djankov et al. (2010). 
 A main finding is that the tariff equivalents of the time 
to import are higher than the average applied import tariffs for most EU countries. This 
5 Other empirical papers in the literature on trade procedures include Wilson et al. (2003; 2005), Lee and 
Park (2007), Nordås et al. (2006), Iwanow and Kirkpatrick (2007) and Sadikov (2007). 
6 These data come from Hummels (2007), to which we refer for a more detailed presentation of the method 
used to calculate tariff equivalents. Briefly, however, tariff equivalents are estimated in three steps: 1) the 
estimation of the value of time savings for each product per day, 2) the estimation of the time savings for 
each country per day on the basis of the country’s import structure, 3) the estimation of the tariff 
equivalents of import waiting time with the help of the Doing Business Database.   5 
suggests that trade procedures constitute a comparatively substantial trade barrier, and 
that it is therefore problematic for the EU not to have a uniform practice in this area. 
Table 1.  Trade Procedures as an Import Barrier in the European Union  
EU country  Time in days to comply with  
all import procedures 
Tariff equivalent of the time to 
comply with import procedures 
Average applied 
import tariff 2001 
Cyprus  5  -  - 
Denmark  5  1.4  2.4 
Estonia  5  3.8  0.8 
Luxembourg  6  -  - 
Netherlands  6  1.9  2.1 
Sweden  6  1.4  2.1 
Germany  7  2.2  1.8 
Austria  8  5.0  1.8 
Finland  8  1.8  1.9 
United Kingdom  8  4.6  2.7 
Belgium  9  2.3  3.0 
Spain  10  4.1  2.4 
France  11  4.6  1.8 
Lithuania  11  5.9  0.8 
Ireland  12  5.4  1.5 
Latvia  12  8.0  1.9 
Romania  13  4.1  6.3 
Portugal  15  4.3  4.2 
Hungary  17  7.2  2.8 
Italy  18  13.1  2.0 
Czech Republic  20  7.8  3.9 
Bulgaria  21  9.6  7.7 
Slovenia  21  8.2  10.2 
Greece  25  5.6  2.2 
Poland  25  6.3  3.3 
Slovak Republic  25  5.6  3.1 
Average  13  5.2  3.2 
Minimum  5  1.4  0.8 
Maximum  25  13.1  10.2 
Note: Data on the days needed to comply with all necessary import procedures come from the Doing 
Business Database (see World Bank 2010a). There is no data for Malta in the Doing Business Database. 
Data on tariff equivalents of this time and average applied (trade weighted) import tariffs are from 
Hummels (2007). 
   6 
2.2  Is the EU Really a Customs Union? 
The two main components of a customs union are the removal of trade barriers to internal 
trade and the adoption of a common trade policy on trade with non-member countries. 
The common trade policy concerns tariffs as well as non-tariff barriers. Hence, the 
significant disparities in trade procedures noted among the European countries suggest 
that the European Union is not a customs union in the strict economic sense of the term. 
In fact, it could be considered a free trade area. It is, however, an imperfect form of free 
trade area since it is not equipped with rules of origin to prevent trade deflection.    
What are the economic implications of the EU’s de facto  failure to have a 
common external trade policy? It may be expected to cause both trade deflection and 
price differences between EU countries. Trade deflection refers to importing  into an 
integrated area through the country (or countries) with the least restrictive trade policy for 
re-export to another member country (or other member countries) with a more restrictive 
trade policy. In the case of large disparities in trade procedures, as those illustrated in 
Table 1, this suggests that imports will tend to enter the European Union through the 
countries with the most efficient trade procedures, and in a second stage be redirected to 
the countries with less efficient trade procedures.
7
Different trade procedures on imports from outside countries, associated with 
positive transport costs, may also result in different prices on the domestic markets of the 
EU countries.  Higher domestic prices are expected in countries protected by more 
burdensome trade procedures and insulated by relatively high transport costs. This is an 
explanatory factor that has been bypassed in studies of price differentials in the European 
Union (see,  for example, Engel and Rogers 2004). Price differentials also create 
incentives for the producers of the member countries with the most efficient trade 
procedures to increase their export to the countries with the least efficient trade 
procedures. To continue to satisfy domestic consumption, countries with more efficient 
trade procedures can in turn increase their imports from third countries. Disparities in the 
costs of trade procedures across member countries may thus also contribute to an indirect 
form of trade deflection and an expansion of intra-industry trade. 
  
                                                 
7 It should be noted that a necessary condition for trade deflection to take place is that the cost of transport 
is lower than the cost differential ascribed to differing trade procedures.   7 
To summarize, measuring the effectiveness of cross-border trade procedures by 
the time delays that they cause, we argue that the large variation in such import delays 
across EU countries suggests that the EU does not have a common external trade policy. 
This would imply that the EU does not meet the requirements of a customs union. This 
argument of course rests on the assertion that the border delays caused by varying trade 
procedures actually have a substantial effect on volumes of trade. We test this hypothesis 
in the next section. 
3  Estimating Quantitative Effects of Trade Procedures 
3.1  Model Specification and Estimation Method 
To investigate whether cumbersome cross-border trade procedures affect trade flows into 
the EU, we estimate a gravity equation on bilateral imports to EU27 countries from the 
rest of the world. The gravity equation has been widely used to estimate the trade effects 
of e.g. preferential trading arrangements, currency unions and various trade costs, and its 
theoretical basis has been established by papers such as Anderson (1979), Bergstrand 
(1985; 1989), Helpman and Krugman (1985), Deardorff (1998) and Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2003). The estimated model is: 
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where Mijct is imports in chapter c to the importing EU country i from exporting country j 
at time t.
8
                                                 
8 Our dependent variable is created by measuring, for all bilateral pairs and years, the volume of imports for 
each of the 97 chapters in the Harmonized System (HS). The advantage of studying trade volumes on such 
a detailed level is that we can control for a lot of the exporters’ unobserved trade characteristics by means 
of fixed effects for every combination of exporter and chapter. This strongly reduces the potential problems 
with omitted variables. 
 The explanatory variable of main interest is Timeit. This variable measures the 
number of days it takes to comply with all necessary procedures at the border when 
importing to the various EU27 countries. This will therefore be our proxy for the costs 
that trade procedures cause. The other explanatory variables include the importing and 
exporting countries’ GDP and GDP per capita, the distance in kilometres between the   8 
largest cities in the importing and exporting country respectively, and dummy variables 
taking the value one if the trading countries share a common border, have the same 
official language or have  been in a colonial relationship. λt  is a time-specific effect 
capturing all heterogeneity common for all trade flows in one year but differing over time 
(such as business cycle effects), while μjc is a specific effect for every combination of 
exporter and product  chapter.  The latter is important, because it captures  all  time-
invariant  heterogeneity  based on observed and unobserved differences in product or 
exporter characteristics. It specifically controls for the exporter’s degree of export success 
with  a given product based on such things  as  geographical conditions  (for instance 
landlockedness), natural resources or quality of institutions.
9
Focusing on imports to EU27 countries over the time period 2006-2008 (being the 
longest period for which we could find data on both trade and time delays), we include all 
other countries in the world as exporters. Measuring the volume of trade for each chapter 
in the Harmonized System, we get a large number of potential  trade flows. Not 
surprisingly, the observed volume of trade is zero in very many of the observations.  
 εijct is a disturbance term. 
For data sources, see Table 3 in the Appendix. 
We use a fixed effects Poisson Pseudo-Maximum-Likelihood (PPML) estimation 
of the equation in its original multiplicative form. This solution was first suggested by 
Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), who noted that this estimator has two advantages over 
the traditional approach of making the model linear by taking logarithms and then 
estimating it by a Least Squares (LS) estimator. First, the PPML estimator can be used on 
the model in its original multiplicative form, implying that the observations with zero 
trade flows do not have to be dropped. Given that the value of trade is zero for a lot of the 
observations in our dataset, this is particularly relevant. Second, the PPML estimator is 
consistent, even in the presence of heteroskedasticity. This is not true for the LS 
estimator. While Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) used cross-sectional data to illustrate 
the advantages of the PPML estimator, Westerlund and Wilhelmsson (2009) have shown 
                                                 
9 Note that, due to the fact that all importing EU27 countries have the same import tariffs, these fixed 
effects broadly capture the level of tariff protection that different types of products from various exporters 
face.    9 
that, in a panel-data setting, a fixed effects PPML estimator (with robust standard errors) 
strongly outperforms a corresponding log-linear fixed effects model.
10
3.2  Estimation Results 
 
The results from the PPML estimation of equation (1) are displayed in Table 4 in the 
Appendix (column a). We have a large number of observations; over 800 000, but more 
than 500 000 of these observations are actually zero. Since trade may be zero precisely 
because the trade costs caused by cumbersome trade procedures are so high that traders 
do not even begin to trade, it is of course very important not to ignore these zeroes in the 
estimations.  There  are over 11 000 combinations of exporting country and product 
chapter.
11
As shown in Table 4, the estimated coefficient for the level of time delays in the 
importing country is highly statistically significant and has a negative sign. The 
coefficient may be interpreted as an elasticity, so a one-percent increase in border delays 
would on average lead to export volumes being diminished by 0.44 percent. In other 
words, the time delays caused by trade procedures do indeed have a significantly negative 
effect on trade volumes. It follows that a country which reforms its trade procedures so 
that time delays at the border are decreased could expect to see increased import volumes. 
  
We do not have much to say about the other gravity variables. Typically, they 
behave as expected. The product of the trading countries’ GDP has a significantly 
positive coefficient: the larger either economy is, the larger the traded volumes. Richer 
importers generally import significantly less, while richer exporters export significantly 
more. Distance has a significantly negative coefficient, while sharing a common border, a 
common language or a colonial history are all factors which significantly increase trade 
volumes.  
                                                 
10 An alternative to the PPML estimation would be to follow Helpman et al (2008), who propose using a 
form of sample selection estimation to solve the problem of zero trade flows being dropped. While 
theoretically appealing due to its basis in a heterogeneous-firm type trade theory (see Melitz 2003), this 
method introduces the new difficulty of finding a suitable exclusion restriction for identification of the 
second-stage equation. This is in practice quite difficult to do. 
11 Since we include fixed effects at the exporter-chapter level, all 3363 groups where an exporter does not 
export anything at all from a single chapter to any importer are dropped. This restriction is not made when 
we use the random effects specification in the robustness section below.    10 
3.3  Robustness 
Since we have a very varied set of exporters in our sample, one could be concerned that 
the results found above only apply to certain kinds of exporters. To see whether this is the 
case, we estimate a less restrictive version of the baseline model, where the effects of EU 
import delays are allowed to differ for low-income, middle-income and high-income 
exporters respectively. As shown in Table 4 (column b), the differences between low-
income and high-income countries are actually  quite small, while middle-income 
countries appear to be somewhat less sensitive to delays caused by trade procedures. 
Nevertheless, the coefficient for time delays is significantly negative for all three types of 
exporters. 
While we, further, believe that a fixed effects PPML estimator is a good choice 
for estimating the model, we also use some alternative estimators to test the robustness of 
the results. The results are shown in Table 4. First, we use a (fixed effects) negative 
binomial model, which is the most commonly used alternative to a Poisson model. We 
secondly replace the fixed effects in the baseline model with random effects, and thirdly 
remove the exporter-chapter specific effects altogether. We further use the traditional 
least squares fixed effects estimator (implying that the model must be log-linearized and 
all zero trade flows dropped) and finally the benchmark fixed effects Poisson model 
estimated on data where all zero trade flows have already been dropped.  Very 
reassuringly, regardless of estimation method, which type of specific effect (if any) that is 
used, and whether or not the zeroes are included in the sample, the coefficient for our 
time delay variable is always highly significant and negative. 
4  What Would be Gained by Harmonization? 
The question that arises now is how much exports from outside countries are going to be 
affected by reformed trade procedures. To offer some understanding of what the data and 
estimation results mean in an economic sense, we use the estimate for the effect of time 
delays, and calculate how strongly trade volumes respond to changes in time delays. 
Three scenarios are presented in Table 2. First, if all EU countries reduced the time 
needed to comply with all import procedures by one day, aggregated exports from outside 
countries to the EU would increase by 4.8 percent for the average exporting country   11 
(using our benchmark Poisson estimates). It should be noted that trade effects across EU 
countries are likely not evenly distributed because they start at different initial levels of 
time delays to trade across borders, and the volume of import from outside countries and 
the relative importance of time-sensitive and time-insensitive imports in countries’ import 
differ. As a robustness measure, Table 2 also illustrates that simulation using estimates 
from a negative binomial model leads to aggregate volume increases of 3.5 percent. Since 
the negative binomial model is the alternative estimation technique yielding the lowest 
elasticity, this figure may be seen as a lower bound for the expected effects of trade 
facilitation reform. 
 
Table 2.   Simulation Results 
 
Baseline (Poisson)  Robustness (Negative Binomial) 
Scenario 1: One day less for all  4.8  3.5 
Scenario 2: Down to average if above  3.0  2.2 
Scenario 3: All achieve best practice  19.7  14.5 
Note: The figures illustrate how much an average exporting country’s total export volume to the EU would 
rise following trade procedure reforms in the EU. Three scenarios are considered. In Scenario 1, delays at 
the border fall by one day in all EU countries. In Scenario 2, the countries having border delays above the 
EU average improve so that they reach the average, while the others do nothing. In Scenario 3, all EU 
countries reach the level of border delays that the currently most efficient countries have. The figures using 
Poisson estimates are considered as the benchmark, but simulation figures using negative binomial 
estimates are also included for comparison. 
 
In view of the large disparities in the time necessary to trade across borders between the 
EU countries, a first step if one wants to improve the situation could be to concentrate 
efforts on the poorest performers. We therefore consider a second scenario where the 
countries with time delays above the average reduce their time delays to that average 
(leaving the countries under the average unchanged). In such a scenario, aggregated 
exports from outside countries are expected to increase by 3 percent on average, which is 
less than the change following a one-day improvement for all countries. Using estimates 
from the negative binomial model yields increases of just over 2 percent. 
The third scenario is the most interesting, and is much in line with the initial 
ambition of the EU, namely a customs union in the economic sense of the word open to 
international trade and competition. This scenario corresponds to the improvement of the 
trade procedures to the level of the best performers (5 days to import the same good).   12 
Completing the customs union this way boosts aggregated exports from outside countries 
by some 20 percent on average. Using estimates from the negative binomial model yields 
a somewhat lower estimate, 14.5 percent, suggesting that effects are sizeable even when 
we consider the most conservative estimates. It is likely that the one fifth-increase in 
imports  from outside countries is unequally distributed among the EU countries. 
Contrasting the results of scenarios 1 and 3 suggests that the larger effects are likely 
concentrated in countries with medium-range procedures at the outset. Nevertheless, the 
results indicate that the aggregated exports would increase quite substantially for the 
average exporting country if the EU actually completed its customs union. 
Simulations such as these should of course never be taken too literally, but we 
would like to point out that our calculation of the expected effects of reform is actually 
likely to err on the side of caution rather than exaggerate the effects. For one thing, the 
use of alternative estimates from several estimation models suggests that the results are 
substantial, even when we consider the lower bound of the expected effects. More 
importantly, however, in these simulations, only existing trade flows are allowed to be 
affected by the harmonization of trade procedures. However, we know from the literature 
that trade barriers such as these also have strong effects on the possibility of trading 
products internationally at all. In other words, in many cases time delays due to 
inefficient trade procedures may simply be too large for a product to be able to be 
shipped. Trade facilitation will therefore create new trade volumes, and this effect could 
be as important as the increase in the existing trade flows. Since we do not take these 
effects into account, our simulated increases should be seen as conservative. It is 
interesting that the effects are nevertheless sizable.  
5  Summarizing Arguments: Should the Responsibility for Trade 
Procedures be Redistributed? 
The European Union is formally a customs union. The choice of this form of integration 
was made by the six founding countries, which considered it the most suitable form of 
economic integration. A main reason behind this choice was that only customs unions 
have the potential to develop into deeper forms of integration with the complete removal 
of barriers to internal trade. However, focusing on the cross-border trade procedures   13 
discussed in the literature about trade facilitation, we argue that since there is a lot of 
variation in trade procedures between EU countries, the EU does not meet the customs 
union condition of having a common external trade policy.  
Measuring the effectiveness of cross-border trade procedures by the time delays 
that they cause, we illustrate that these delays vary considerably within the EU. In fact, 
they go from merely 5 days in the most efficient countries to 25 days in some others. To 
examine whether these variations in trade policy have the potential to affect trade 
volumes, we formally test in a regression analysis whether delays at the border due to 
cross-border trade procedures have any significant effect on import volumes to EU 
countries from the rest of world. Interestingly, we find a highly statistically significant 
and negative effect, with at an elasticity of -0.44. To put this result into an economic 
perspective, we show in a simulation that if the EU were to harmonize import procedures 
to the level of the currently most efficient EU countries, the average non-member would 
increase its aggregated exports to the EU by around 20 percent. In other words, the 
expected effects of such a completion of the EU customs union are substantial. 
What are the prospects of achieving the harmonization we argue is needed if the 
EU seriously wants to constitute a customs union? Currently, import procedures are still 
under the responsibility of the member countries. A full harmonization can be difficult to 
achieve, at least in the short and medium term. Customs practices, skill levels and social 
capital elements (reliance on trading firms) are the kind of factors that take time to 
change.  On the other hand, the use of information technology, risk management 
techniques and computerized container scanning can be relatively rapidly improved and 
harmonized across EU countries. It is hard, however, to see how this type of 
harmonization could occur without the explicit involvement of the European 
Commission. According to the subsidiarity principle, the European Commission should 
only handle tasks that cannot be performed effectively at the national level. Since this, we 
argue, is the case for trade procedure harmonization, we conclude that if the objective of 
the EU is the completion of a customs union, the subsidiarity principle commands a 
redistribution of responsibility for the design and monitoring of trade procedures from the 
member countries to the European Commission.   14 
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Appendix 
Table 3.  Variables and Data Sources 
Variable  Definition and Data Source 
Imports  Import volume at the Harmonized System (HS) chapter level. Data from 
Eurostat (2010). 
Time for imports  Number of days it takes to comply with all necessary procedures at the border 
when importing to the various EU27 countries. Data from World Bank (2010a). 
GDP  Data from World Bank (2010b). 
GDP per capita   Data from World Bank (2010b). 
Distance  Distance in kilometres between the largest cities in the importing and exporting 
country respectively. Data from CEPII (2010). 
Common border  Takes the value one if the importer and exporter shares a common border. Data 
from CEPII (2010). 
Common language  Takes the value one if the importer and exporter shares a common language. 
Data from CEPII (2010). 
Colonial history  Takes the value one if the importer and exporter shares a common colonial 




Table 4.  Estimation Results 
 
Baseline  Robustness 





effect varying  
















(a)  (b)  (c)  (d)  (e)  (f)  (g) 
Time for imports  -0.438*** 
 




(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Low income countries 
 
-0.528*** 
         
   
(0.000) 
          Middle income countries 
 
-0.338*** 
         
   
(0.000) 
          High income countries 
 
-0.585*** 
         
   
(0.000) 
          GDP importer*GDP exporter  0.852***  0.850***  0.495***  0.852***  0.848***  1.189***  0.804*** 
 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
GDP per capita importer  -0.270***  -0.263***  -0.221***  -0.270***  -0.256***  -0.422***  -0.265*** 
 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
GDP per capita exporter  0.682***  0.831***  -0.00393**  0.682***  -0.245***  -0.541***  0.677*** 
 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.020)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.000) 
Distance  -1.245***  -1.199***  -0.284***  -1.245***  -0.784***  -1.855***  -1.143*** 
 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Common border  0.183***  0.188***  1.013***  0.183***  0.691***  0.701***  0.218*** 
 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Table continued overleaf.   17 
Table 4. Continued 
Common language  0.485***  0.474***  0.498***  0.485***  0.0108  0.615***  0.488*** 
 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.909)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Colonial history  0.0778***  0.0943***  0.311***  0.0778***  0.0225  0.563***  0.0479*** 
 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.811)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Time effects  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Exporter-product effects  yes  yes  yes  yes  no  yes  yes 
No of observations  803,560  803,560  803,560  1,045,272  1,045,272  255,657  254,309 
No of exporter-product groups  11,090  11,090  11,090  14,453  -  11,090  9,742 
Note: Column (a) contains the baseline estimation of equation (1) with a fixed effects Poisson model. In column (b), the same estimator is used, but separate effects 
of time delays are allowed for low-income, middle-income and high-income exporters respectively. The remaining columns estimate equation (1) with different 
estimation techniques and/or samples. The estimated models are: (c) a negative binomial model with fixed effects at the exporter-product level; (d) a Poisson model 
with random effects at the exporter-product level; (e) a Poisson model without specific effects at the exporter-product level, i.e. a pooled Poisson model; (f) a log-
linear least squares model with fixed effects at the exporter-product level (N.B. since the dependent variable is logged in this case, all observations with zero trade 
volumes are dropped), and (g) a Poisson model with fixed effects at the exporter-product level where all zero trade flows are dropped. P-values in brackets  (these 
are based on robust standards errors, estimated using Stata’s oim choice, except for the pooled Poisson and least squares estimations where the “robust” alternative 
has been chosen). Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels. 
 